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The problem:
 subcarrier allocation in a downlink, wireless LTE OFDMA channel
The goal:
 harvest Multiuser Diversity benefits in a distributed way
How:
 using Game Theory (Coalition Formation & Bargaining)
The result:
 a distributed, fair & efficient scheduler
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 As the wireless channel fluctuates (both in time and frequency):
 some users may experience high channel gain
 some other experience bad channel quality
Therefore: 
there is probably always a user with 
high channel quality
with more users, higher probability 
smart scheduling exploits this 
probability
Overall throughput is increased
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Downlink, single antenna SCM LTE channel
Single Base Station, with wireless nodes 
scattered around within a 150m radius
Propagation model: SCM Urban Macro
Our metrics:
 theoretical rate (Shannon capacity)
 fairness (using Jain’s Fairness index)
 overheads (i.e. scheduler-specific overheads only)
We compare against the Proportional Fair scheduler
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Overview:
i. first, users are randomly partitioned into coalitions
ii. then, each coalition is randomly assigned a number of subcarrier groups
iii. for each partition, Nash Bargaining takes place within each coalition
iv. finally, the partition that maximizes sum rate is selected
Key points:
 all coalitions are equal in size (except when there are not “enough” users)
 each coalition gets the same number of subcarrier groups
 each coalition member gets the same number of subcarrier groups
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Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS):
 cooperative solution
 maximises operating points simultaneously for all participants 
 works by maximizing the product of the utilities (or pay-off) of the participants:
 guarantees a minimum pay-off (or disagreement point) for everyone
Important: we set disagreement point = 0
Out utility function is rate : sbitsHSNR
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Key points: 
Each coalition has a master device (chosen at random)
There is also a leader device (randomly chosen)
Beaconing is used for coordination
coalition A
coalition B
coalition C
master
master master
leader
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Subcarrier grouping
 makes scheduler lightweight & faster
Equal number of subcarriers per user
 guarantees proportional fairness & makes scheduler faster.
Permutations sampling
 not all user - subcarrier group permutations are tested
Partitions sampling
 not all partitions of users into coalitions are tested
Realizations step
 i.e. allocation process repeated less often
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Sum rate:
 compared against 
Proportional Fair scheduler
 ranges from 70% to 108% of 
the PF sum rate
Coalition size:
 larger coalitions increase rate
 but increase complexity
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Fairness:
 compared against the 
Proportional Fair scheduler, 
using Jain’s Fairness Index
 fairness achieved is almost 
identical to PF
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Results 3 - efficiency improvements 
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Realization step:
 overheads reduced
 scheduler gets faster
 rate only slightly reduced
 fairness is the same
Partition step:
 similar benefits
 rate marginally affected
 fairness is the same
permutation step: similar benefits
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* = % of the respective, original values before  applying efficiency improvements
*
*
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Comparison with:
 Proportional Fair 
scheduler
 the centralized * version
of the NBS scheduler 
presented in our paper
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* = exactly the same scheduler, apart from the centralized 
coordination. Only overheads and required time change 
when compared to the distributed version
Conclusions
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Very fast scheduler
Reduced overheads
Sum rate comparable to Proportional Fair scheduler
Fairness almost identical to Proportional Fair
Larger coalitions offer more rate but induce complexity
• INTRODUCTION
• THE SCHEDULER
• RESULTS
• CONCLUSIONS
Questions?
15/15
Thank you!
• INTRODUCTION
• THE SCHEDULER
• RESULTS
• CONCLUSIONS
